An interesting blog by Daniel Rozas and Sanjay Sinha (Microfinance Focus) on self-regulation in the Indian microfinance industry.
Previously Daniel Rozas has made a case on the existence of a microfinance bubble in India. From the debate is has become clear that the current path of multiple lending and rapid growth in the Indian microfinance industry is unsustainable. New data shows:
Market penetration has continued its rapid growth, with Indian MFIs adding six million customers in 2009. This is of course good news. [...] of the top five growth contributors, the three southern states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu contributed 54% of new MFI clients in India during 2009. Since these states in 2008 already accounted for nearly half of all microfinance clients in India, the clear conclusion is that growth continues to be driven by states with an already large client base.
Yet, one ‘advantage’ of the concentration of local growth is that it helps to keep local delinquency crises (found in Southern India) from spreading.
The question is: can self-regulation prevent (the bursting of) a bubble? The authors welcome the idea of establishing credit bureau(s) and recognize the call for a Code of Conduct by Indian MFIs, placing ‘boundaries’ on multiple lending.
According to the authors, this top-down approach of implementing boundaries:
… to limit MFI lending to no more than three loans and a maximum combined amount of Rs 50,000 ($1,000) per person is a big step in the right direction. This limit, [...] , will no doubt slow growth, most notably in already saturated regions. But with the high growth rates currently enjoyed by top MFIs along with the broadening of their national presence, sacrificing some part of that growth is a small price to pay for insuring against the downside risks of unbridled growth.
Finally, the auhtors express a number of concerns:
- market situations may rapidly change, reducing the incentive for MFIs to comply with standards or codes;
- how will participating MFIs be monitored?;
- what enforcement mechanisms will be used?;
- what to do with ‘outside’ actors?
- what can/should be the role of the government?
Posted in industry self-regulation, microfinance bubbles, responsible finance.
Tagged with code of conduct, India, industry self-regulation, microfinance bubbles, multiple lending, rapid growth, regulation.
By admin
– June 11, 2010
In How Responsible Are Microfinance Investors? Antonique Koning (CGAP) discusses the expectations and responsibilities of investors in microfinance.
Investors are asked to reflect on their own growth expectations and their assessment of governance and growth capacity of MFIs and debt saturation levels in the market.
On “reasonable” financial returns, Koning states:
This brings us to the realm of business ethics in microfinance: how much money should an investor and the MFI make?; what is obscene (or too much) and what is appropriate?; and who should pass that moral judgment?
Koning concludes:
We are only at the beginning of this debate. The responsibilities and expectations of microfinance investors and managers are coming under increased scrutiny. What metrics to use to measure responsible investment and, more important, how to determine what standards are acceptable, will be key questions to address in the coming months. Watch this space.
Posted in donors and investors, microfinance bubbles, responsible finance.
Tagged with antonique koning, cgap, financial returns, microfinance investors, responsible financial returns, responsible microfinance.
By admin
– June 10, 2010
Transparency, competition, and easier access to capital may encourage microfinance institutions to deviate from their original social mission. The phenomenon of mission drift caputures the trade-off between the profitability of microfinance institutions and their outreach to the poorest microfinance clients.
Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Morduch (2007) define mission drift as
… a shift in the composition of new clients, or a reorientation from poorer to wealthier clients among existing clients.
Armendáriz and Szafarz (2009) define mission drift as
… a phenomenon whereby an MFI increases its average loan size by reaching out wealthier clients neither for progressive lending nor for cross subsidization reasons.
In more detail, a natural increase in average loan sizes may result from progressive lending, whereby microfinance clients reach out to higher credit ceiling based on their performance and demand. Also, average loan sizes may be rise resulting from cross-subsidisation. Cross-subsidisation means that a MFI reaches out to the wealthier unbanked, in order to finance a larger pool of the poorest unbanked.
Instead, mission drift occurs because MFIs find it more profitable to reach out to wealthier clients while crowding out poorer clients. A commercial rational.
The phenomenon has been identified and discussed in several publications, however not much empirical evidence on the issue has (yet) been presented. This blog aims to provide new insights on the phenomenon, while working on (restoring) the win-win proposition of microfinance.
Posted in mission drift.
Tagged with average loan size, microfinance institutions, mission drift, outreach, profitability, social mission.
By admin
– June 5, 2010
Richard Rosenberg, consultant to CGAP, on the Compartamos Banco Controversy – Leadership and Responsibilities.
Episode 1
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Episode 2
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Episode 3
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For more microfinance podcasts visit: http://www.microfinancepodcast.com/
Posted in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), profit-making behavior.
Tagged with compartamos, financially sustainable, IPO, podcast, Richard Rosenberg.
By admin
– June 5, 2010